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Introduction 
Moral and political theories, insofar as they are based on the finite and fragile 
life of human beings, incorporate or otherwise assume a reflection on the role 
of contingency in individual and collective pursuits. Even if often the goal is 
to curtail its effects, uncertainty always informs them in some way or 
another—whether in Plato’s effort to arrange the political community and the 
life of the soul according to immutable and eternal ideas; in Hobbes’ project 
to eliminate insecurity within the Leviathan; in Kant’s rejection of any source 
of variability at the foundation of morals; or finally, in Rawls’ proscription of 
luck in the overlapping consensus of justice. 
According to Martha Nussbaum, however, any theory disposed to 
accommodate uncertainty will most surely have the virtue of acknowledging, 
as Aristotle did, two important truths: first, the centrality of action as an object 
of moral and political reflection, regardless of its always vulnerable character; 
second, that fragility and finitude not only threaten sociability and virtue, but 
constitute their very conditions of possibility as well. Perfection, universality, 
and the eternal thus lie beyond both the practical aims of ethics, and the 
normative aims of politics.1 
 Once we acknowledge the moral and political significance of 
uncertainty, making visible its close relation to action and sociability, we 
realize, however, that the question remains, how exactly do we understand or 
experience the fact of uncertainty? Does it simply mean that when we act there 
is no certainty regarding the future? In other words, is its meaning just a 
negative one: that we are not omniscient and omnipotent gods? Or, 
alternatively, is it something more substantial (a “positive name,” as Hobbes 
would say),2 susceptible to multiple translations? Can uncertainty show us 
different faces, to which we would then react in different ways? If so, what is 
the meaning of such various possibilities for the exercise of agency? 
 Henri Bergson is best known for his reflections on time and memory, 
and for having developed a defense of free will based on an examination of 
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our relation to our own past, and how it affects our capacity to act in the 
present: “We must, by a strong recoil of our personality on itself, gather up 
our past which is slipping away, in order to thrust it, compact and undivided, 
into a present which it will create by entering. Rare indeed are the moments 
when we are self-possessed to this extent: it is then that our actions are truly 
free.”3 Put very succinctly, freedom, for Bergson, is such “entrance” into the 
present: one in which we are capable of “synthetizing” our past—bringing it 
in, so to speak, in its entirety—in order to “create” the present as we act.4 Thus, 
his project has been usually (and rightly) interpreted as a defense of freedom 
on what we can call a “retrospective” basis: his theory of time and memory, 
and of the latter’s relation to matter, are intended to show that we are not 
determined by the past (hence its retrospective character).  
 However, the ways in which the prospect of the future and the fact of 
uncertainty affect our character as agents (and thus our capacity to be free) 
have been less assiduously explored.5 I want to undertake such a task here. 
As I hope to be able to show, Bergson’s reflections on  uncertainty, together 
with his insights on the phenomenology of human action, suggest a critical 
approach to the role of speculation and risk-management in contemporary 
societies, which is different to—although not necessarily incompatible with—
other critical perspectives, such as those coming from communitarians and 
post-structuralists.  
 While communitarians have given us reasons to be suspicious of the 
ways in which chance, risk, and uncertainty taint our institutions and our 
collective practices from the point of view of justice, Bergson’s treatment—
and in this he is close to post-structuralism—brings out the ways in which our 
relation to uncertainty shapes our identity and our agency. Still, in contrast 
with the post-structuralist outlook, he is less concerned with developing 
resistance strategies in the face of power, and instead, invites us to consider 
the ways in which we can adapt, adjust, and make our agency more flexible 
in the face of unforeseen and changing circumstances.  
 For these purposes, I will turn, not to his early work on time and free 
will, but instead to the study of the modern belief in chance that he offers in 
his last book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, published originally in 
1932, against nothing less than an immediate background of increasing 
political uncertainty in Europe and elsewhere. Bergson presents there his 
elucidation of the modern belief in chance as part of a debate about the 
differences between the so-called “primitive” and “civilized” mentalities—or, 
put differently, between the enchanted world of magic and the disenchanted 
world of science.6 For our purposes, one of the main arguments advanced in 
the book is that there is only one human nature underlying both kinds of 
mentalities, and therefore—the radical opposition between the two 
notwithstanding—that they are best interpreted as responding to similar 
anthropological conditions.7  
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 One of the key anthropological conditions common to both mentalities 
is their respective susceptibility to the fact of uncertainty. In other words, both 
the primitive and the civilized mentalities have to develop strategies to cope 
with the series of challenges that uncertainty poses to action. The relevance of 
such strategies resides in that they constitute important pedagogical 
mechanisms in the exercise of human agency—strongly suggesting, therefore, 
that our relation to the future has, from a Bergsonian perspective, a very 
important role to play in the constitution of freedom in action. 
Yet, since Bergson’s own treatment in The Two Sources will not fully 
bring to light the point that I intend to investigate, I will resort to the French 
philosopher and poet Jean-Marie Guyau, and his reflections on what he calls 
“the love of risk.” His work is especially pertinent, because, as we will see, 
Guyau’s “love of risk” constitutes yet another way of dealing with the 
unexpected, which, on the one hand, amplifies agency—making it sharper 
and more assertive—and on the other, by the same token, ends up threatening 
it as well. Thus, the spectrum that opens up between Bergson’s “belief in 
chance” and Guyau’s “love of risk” nicely illustrates the moral stakes that 
human agency has in its relation to uncertainty.  
Moreover, Guyau and Bergson were intellectually and biographically 
connected. Bergson, only four years younger than Guyau, was a student at 
the Lycée Condorcet, while the latter served there as a professor in 1876. In 
1885, Guyau published a couple of articles offering a theory of time, which 
were later posthumously edited by Alfred Fouillée (his stepfather) with 
Bergson’s help. Bergson himself published a review of the book in 1891.8 
Guyau lived a short, and yet intellectually vigorous and passionate, life. He 
was a precocious and very prolific author—his first substantial investigation 
on utilitarianism (more than 1000 pages long) was written at age 20, and 
before dying at the age of 33, he published various books on aesthetics, 
morality, sociology, and education, in addition to poetry and some illustrated 
manuals of morals. 
Even if Guyau remains a considerably obscure figure, especially outside 
of the French-speaking world, important studies of his thought have 
appeared as of late. These works show that in his own time, Guyau was 
meticulously studied by Durkheim,9 highly regarded by Nietzsche,10 and 
considerably influential for a good number of anarchists and artists.11 While 
the extent of Guyau’s influence on Bergson has been adequately assessed, and 
their affinities on the topics of time and obligation already explored,12 their 
respective treatments of risk and chance have not, to my knowledge, been 
contrasted yet.  
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The half-personal face of chance and its pedagogical value 
For a being endowed only with instinct, uncertainty does not exist. “An 
animal,” says Bergson, “is sure of itself. In his case nothing intervenes 
between aim and act.”13 However, for a being that, besides instinct, possesses 
intelligence, a gap is soon opened between projects and outcomes, which 
discloses in turn the sole ground in which expectation, desire, fear, and hope 
can ever possibly grow. We call this gap “uncertainty.” Thus, even if, on the 
one hand, we tend to think that intelligence reduces uncertainty through 
foresight, planning, and regulation, it is on the other hand true that without 
intelligence the problem of control would not even arise in the first place. 
Therefore, we are forced to admit, Bergson thinks, that intellectual activity is 
originally not what facilitates action by its command over nature, but what 
compromises it—to use his own words—by “introducing hesitation into it.”14 
 Intelligence itself will solve part of the problem, but there will always 
be left some margin of uncertainty, against which it remains powerless. In 
order to circumvent paralysis, nature endows the intelligent being with what 
Bergson calls “virtual instinct.” This instinct will allow human beings, the 
intelligent species par excellence, to resist the discouragement in action that 
follows from the limits of rational insight into the future.15 But, what is this 
virtual instinct? And how does it provide the necessary impulse for 
movement? 
 According to Bergson, our capacity of fabulation performs precisely 
such instinctive function.16 Fabulation (la fonction fabulatrice), or our “myth-
making faculty” as it has been usually translated into English, is our capacity 
to create certain “phantasmic images” (images phantasmatiques),17 which 
constitute a defensive reaction of nature “against the representation, by 
intelligence, of a depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative 
taken and the effect desired.”18  
 Fabulation, Bergson claims, is manifest in the so-called primitive 
societies, where the appeal to mystic causes is a regular practice. So, for 
example, if a beloved friend was killed in an accident, the primitive man will 
posit a mystic cause to explain the tragic event. Contesting Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl’s interpretation of the phenomenon, Bergson says that the primitive 
man does not recur to mystic causes to explain every possible happening in 
the world, but rather only those which have a particular human significance. 
He concludes therefore that what the supernatural cause explains is never the 
physical effect, but its meaning.  
For Bergson, the primitive man, without denying the operation of 
proximate causes, believes additionally that there is a “momentous fact” that 
remains to be explained: say, the death of a man. Bergson claims that there is 
nothing illogical, prelogical, or impervious to experience in such belief.19 The 
event surely pertains to a different ontological order, and therefore it is only 
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appropriate for the man to look not just for any reason to explain it, but for an 
intention behind it.  
Now, most importantly, in Bergson’s view, evidence shows that the so-
called civilized mentality is actually very close in this respect to the primitive 
one. While the former sees mystic causes operating everywhere, the latter sees 
chance at work all over the place. Those are prima facie opposite views: the 
one lives in an animated world, the latter in a mechanistic one. However, says 
Bergson, whenever the primitive man is reproached for not believing in 
chance, or even when it is simply stated that one of his characteristics is “not 
to believe in chance,” the “civilized” man inevitably admits the existence of 
chance.20 Of course, the “civilized” man will rejoin that he “admits” the 
existence of chance, only to the extent that it amounts to a negation of the 
animated world: chance is just a name for such refutation, and for the set of 
probabilities left in the absence of mystic causes; but properly speaking it is 
nothing. Nothing substantial, at least.  
It is clear, Bergson concedes, that the civilized man does not make of 
chance a completely active force. Chance is certainly impersonal, but if it were 
a “mere nothing,” he suggests, we would not even consider using the word.21 
And indeed, Bergson thinks, in spite of all the civilizing elements that inform 
it, modern mentality will naturally glide into a more personal conception of 
chance. He gives the example of a roulette gambler who, by attributing his 
success or failure to good or bad luck, already conceives of chance in terms of 
a favorable or unfavorable intention.22 Thus, from being a purely mechanical 
outcome, the event is transformed so as to be of human significance.  
Certainly, the gambler is completely capable of explaining the result by 
appealing to natural causes (the force with which the roulette was turned, the 
weight of the ball, etc.); but when, on top of that, the thought crosses his mind 
that “it was good/bad luck,” he is, according to Bergson, already “objectifying 
his will to win, and the resistance to this will […] in order to feel the presence 
of a hostile or friendly power, and thus give its full interest to the game.”23 
Luck, therefore, interestingly resembles the mystic cause. This proves, our 
author thinks, “the kinship of this spontaneous intelligence with the primitive 
mentality”: “Scratch the surface, abolish everything we owe to an education 
which is perpetual and unceasing, and you find in the depth of our nature 
primitive humanity, or something very near it.”24 
Provided we distinguish in the primitive mind between the faculty for 
myth, on the one hand, and full-fledged mythology, taboos, and magic (in 
sum, primitive religion), on the other, this kinship will easily become 
apparent. While primitive religions are, according to Bergson, only late 
products, and even fixations and distortions of the initial impulse that gave 
rise to them, the fabulation faculty is their original force. This initial impulse 
is the source of indeterminate forces, which oscillate around the physical and 
the moral, orienting human action accordingly.25 Bergson speculates, for 
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instance, that even if taboos ended up being associated with particular things 
or places, this must have been a late solidification of what was originally a 
“naked prohibition,” that is, a sheer force that resists and pushes against 
certain actions.26 Concrete taboos are the end-point of a force expressed in 
fabulation, which “before it completed its work” in primitive societies, it must 
have yielded “many prohibitions which are semi-physical, semi-moral 
restraints on certain individual acts.”27 
Bergson’s analysis reveals that modern people do orient themselves in 
a similar fashion, by way of appealing to semi-impersonal forces. He argues, 
for example, that the sight of a sign-board saying “Trespassers will be 
prosecuted” makes us perceive first of all the sheer prohibition as a resistance 
to our will, whereas only later we “have the vision of the constable lying in 
wait to report us.”28 Building on contemporary child-psychology research, he 
explains that the child who knocks his head against a table and then hits the 
table back, is not simply venting his anger on the table, or mistakenly thinking 
that the table is a person who struck him. “The truth is that between the 
identification of the table with a person and the perception of the table as an 
inanimate object, there lies an intermediate representation which is neither 
that of a thing nor of a person.”29 What the child perceives is the action of 
striking, the intention to hit; the table as an object is an accessory to the 
perception.  
Bergson offers two more truly remarkable examples: William James’ 
description of his experience during the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, in 
which he had the “irresistible perception” of facing such natural phenomenon 
as “a living agent;”30 and Bergson’s own report of his reaction to the 1914 
French war declaration, when he felt struck by the rather concrete character 
of the threat—that is, when a set of initially dispersed actions and events came 
together and, suddenly acquiring almost a personality of their own, formed 
that which we would eventually call World War I.31 
Now, the crucial point to recall here is that, for Bergson, human beings 
share the ambiguous character of the forces that they take themselves to be 
surrounded by, such as the mystic cause, the figure of chance or luck, the war, 
and the earthquake. Their ambiguity resides in that, as conscious beings that 
exist in both time and space, they always do two things. On the one hand, in 
trying to remain true to perception, they attune themselves to the heterogeneity 
of the so-called vital impulse, present both in the flux-like character of their 
inner life (inner perception), as well as in the manifold of sensations that they 
receive from all over (outer perception). On the other hand, however, insofar 
as they are agents—i.e., bodies moving in space—they must always 
“translate” the dense heterogeneity of perception into distinct and clear-cut, 
even if interconnected, actions.32 Such dual condition—constituted both by 
the density of the vital-impulse and the discrete requirements of action—
makes human agency something that is not fully delineated, but that still 
somehow stands out from the continuity of the given. And indeed, Bergson’s 
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phenomenology of action and perception confirms such parallelism in yet 
another, more striking, way.  
According to him, agency and reality are “peers” engaged, so to speak, 
in dialogue and joint action. For instance, according to Bergson, “concepts are 
questions that we ask to reality, from a practical point of view, regarding the 
attitude that we should take toward her, or the attitude that she takes toward 
us.”33 Likewise, what we perceive of reality “poses a question to our 
agency,”34 and therefore, any given fact is always an adaptation of reality to 
the interests of practice.  
Moreover, this dialogue is a fluid exchange, in which clearly defined 
concepts and neatly-defined bodies come only secondarily, as we saw in the 
example of the child and the table. Or consider the fencer—one more of 
Bergson’s examples—who, in order to lunge properly—that is, in order to 
adequately anticipate and react to the reality that confronts him—“knows that 
it is the movement of the point which has drawn the foil [of his adversary] 
forward, that it is the foil that has drawn the arm forward, [and] that it is the 
arm that stretched out the body by stretching out itself.”35 In sum, in our 
dealings with reality, perception of movement, as a datum of experience to 
which we respond in action, has preeminence over the perception of fixed 
matter, and over the production of clear-cut concepts. Therefore, for Bergson, 
there is an original way of relating to the world as agents: flexibly and 
intuitively. Agents—both human and non-human, although in different 
ways—are susceptible to “the call of reality,” which urges them to meet it in 
its own (ambiguous) terms.36 
And yet, as we know, the paradigm of moral action in modernity often 
requires otherwise: it is based on the rigidity—to be sure not of matter—but 
of reason and conceptual clarity. Action is considered moral only when it is 
autonomous—completely voluntary and consciously endorsed, with no place 
for unreflective habit or improvisation. Thus, moral theory establishes a well-
known dichotomy: it reduces all possible activity to absolute voluntarism, on 
the one hand, and absolute automatism, on the other. For Bergson, however, 
this places inappropriate demands for moral agency: it requires us to make 
fully conscious decisions at every moment, supposing therefore, an almost 
omnipotent will.  
Worse still, such demands are not just mistakes attributable to some 
lack of insight on the part of modern philosophers, but rather have their very 
root in intelligence’s natural tendency to, as Bergson says, solidify flexibility 
into categories.37 Given this powerful tendency, I think, our ability to attune 
ourselves to the original vagueness of agency should not be taken for granted. 
We must learn how to do so. Therefore, we need a model of what non-fully 
voluntary activity should look like. 
Bergson’s account suggests that the semi-personal forces that “escort” 
human agency perform exactly that pedagogical function, serving us in more 
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than one way: they not only provide consolation in the face of frustration and 
disappointment, as Bergson himself explicitly maintains in The Two Sources, 
but offer a “mirror” as well on which to reflect and shape our own agency—
a conclusion that, moreover, seems warranted, I think, by his phenomenology 
of action, as we have just reviewed it.38 In other words, the virtual instinct of 
our myth-making faculty shows us a bridge or a compromise between, 
voluntary and distinctly personal action, and dead matter subject to blind 
necessity. And in doing so, it “trains” us to better deal with uncertainty. 
Let us put it this way: uncertainty “offends” a completely defined and 
established personality, for which only the categorical will suffice. On the 
contrary, contingency is not necessarily an embarrassing match for what 
remains supple and unfinished anyway. As we come to acknowledge non-
fully voluntary or semi-automatic activity in the world, we grasp a deflated 
and more flexible version of our own will. Again, this virtual instinct 
“coaches” us not only by encouraging action in the face of the depressing 
margin between our expectations and an eventual failure, but also, I think, by 
enabling us to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities and happy 
fortuities.  
Thus, by transforming occurrences “into an Event, which resembles a 
human being,” the myth-making faculty establishes, as Bergson says, “a 
certain comradeship” between my circumstance and myself, which in itself 
carries great pedagogical value.39 Therefore, we come to see that while, for 
Bergson, the way in which we relate to our past is central to elucidate the 
meaning freedom, his account of action shows that a certain relation to the 
future—and, consequently, to uncertainty—plays a paramount role as well.  
 
The belief in chance and superstition 
Like I said before, according to Bergson, primitive religions are a late 
development of what started off as an original and healthy tendency to 
identify semi-personal forces in the outside world. Such a tendency, however, 
often gets out of control: following a “logic of absurdity,” “primitive” religion 
endlessly piles up one superstition over another, “lead[ing] the mind even 
further and further astray towards wilder and wilder consequences.”40 As 
Frédéric Keck explains, these religions are according to Bergson “a sign of a 
morbid tendency, the human tendency to think without acting, a form of 
collective dream or hallucination.”41 The mind embarks on an imaginative 
race, by which the once healthy myth-making faculty engages in an 
hallucinatory multiplication of absurdities, without any scruple about the 
intellectual superiority of its inventions.42 
However, notice that this tendency, even if it ends up in the realm of 
the irrational, the absurd, and even the monstrous, is not in itself foreign to 
intelligence. As Bergson writes, “An essentially intelligent being is naturally 
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superstitious, and […] intelligent creatures are the only superstitious 
beings.”43 Moreover, since, as we saw, “The intelligence of primitive peoples 
is not essentially different from our own; [both have a tendency] to convert 
the dynamic into the static, and solidify actions into things,”44 this 
superstitious inclination should be present in both primitive and civilized 
mentalities. 
If this is so, then the question is: what would such a tendency look like 
in the civilized context? If in primitive religion, the myth-making faculty 
“fashion[s], out of the elementary personalities looming up at the outset, gods 
that assume more and more exalted form like those of mythology,”45 what 
kind of god-like figure can be fashioned out of the belief in chance? As we saw 
before, due to our myth-making faculty, the belief in chance already takes the 
form of the semi-personal force of luck. But then, again, the question is: what 
would it mean for our belief in chance to take one more step forward, and 
transmogrify into an absurd “collective dream or hallucination,” as it is pulled 
by the corrupting influence of a hypertrophic imagination and an intelligence 
that solidifies action, and “converts the dynamic into the static”?  
Bergson does discuss cases of superstition in the civilized world, and 
we have already reviewed some of his examples of our tendency to personify 
events (James and the earthquake, Bergson and the war, the child and the 
table). But Bergson’s The Two Sources lacks a more sustained reflection, 
parallel to that on primitive religion, about the morbid proclivities of the 
reification of chance, when it is aggravated and exaggerated along the lines of 
superstition in the primitive mentality. The reason, I think, why Bergson is 
not interested in that question is simply that in The Two Sources he has a very 
different agenda—namely, exploring what he calls “open morality.” After all, 
a crucial purpose of the book is to examine the “leap” that is required to arrive 
from the closed to the open perspective on morality and sociability. And, to 
be sure, the “insurance device” against the type of contingency specific to the 
open sphere will not be some corrupt version of chance, but on the contrary, 
the mystical confidence that “lifts the soul to another plane,” “ensur[ing] for 
[it] to a preeminent degree, the security and the serenity which is the function 
of the static religion to provide.”46 However, as Bergson himself admits, “true 
mysticism is rare.”47 Thus, we cannot generally expect to see the confidence 
that bolsters the mystic feeling of humanity. Rather, more often than not, the 
believer in chance, by “the very application of intelligence to life open[s] the 
door to the unforeseen and let[s] in the feeling of risk.”48  
 
The twin brother of chance 
As we have seen already, in Bergson’s account, chance lies on the border 
between the personal and the impersonal. “Chance is mechanism as though 
possessing an intention,” or “an intention emptied of its content.”49 In 
contrast, by the “feeling of risk” I will denote here the civilized mind’s relation 
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to uncertainty, as it yields to the tendency to reify the semi-personal force of 
luck, looking in it for an increasingly more definite “counterpart.”50  
 Just as, for Bergson, the belief in mystic causes and the belief in chance 
(either in the form of good or bad luck) are analogous, in that they are both 
products of our myth-making faculty, I understand the feeling of risk as being 
analogous to the belief in the “extravagant gods of mythology.” To put it in 
Roman terms, risk is chance when it is not anymore simply an appeal to good 
or bad luck, but the full-fledged goddess Fortuna.  
As we will see, compared to chance’s wink, risk’s appeal is much more 
unequivocal. While chance asks us to acknowledge the existence of 
regularities that can be measured and predicted, risk—the “wild” twin 
brother of chance—always elicits our love or our aversion.  It has a more 
defined face, and it asks for a more definite gesture.51  
In turning to Jean-Marie Guyau’s reflections on the “love of risk,” and 
in order to better appreciate the extent to which they are pertinent here, I will 
first review the overlap between his and Bergson’s respective theories of 
obligation.52 Guyau, like Bergson, rejects both rationalist and sentimentalist 
accounts of duty. Both authors share an ontological conviction that there is 
something, beyond both reason and emotions, which ultimately accounts for 
it. This “something” is directly related in both cases to action and movement.  
As we learn in the very first page of the book, the general project of The 
Two Sources is to “discover [the] deeper sources of our moral feelings”53 and 
to explain “how a moral motive can have a hold upon the souls of men.”54 
According to Bergson, no theory of moral obligation in terms of reason or 
sentiments is possible. Just as the most we can do with gravity is devise a 
formula to figure out velocity and acceleration, without entertaining the hope 
of “explaining it away” by appealing to elements beyond the force it exerts, 
Bergson claims that we can build systems of duties that explain why we must 
do x or y, but no theorization of it, as a phenomenon, will follow in terms 
other than itself as a force of nature. Reason intervenes by regulating, but it 
cannot push us to action. Sentiments might solve part of the problem, but they 
do not explain why we have to regulate them in the first place. If obligation 
could speak, Bergson says, it would only articulate the following words: “You 
must because you must.”55 Given this, he thinks that the only way to 
scrutinize obligation is not to look for its cause, but rather to recur to 
phenomena that present similar effects. 
Thus, Bergson turns to instances that, like obligation, produce or 
motivate actions: instincts in animals, and habits in men. That is actually why 
he turns to our myth-making faculty as well: it is similar to duty because its 
effects (i.e., the belief in mystic causes and the belief in chance) are forces that 
exert pressure on acting beings that—to put it in Kantian terms—do not 
pertain only to the noumenal, but also to the phenomenal world.  
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For his part, in A Sketch of Morality without Obligation or Sanction, Guyau 
argues that morality should be looked for in action, in “a kind of natural 
power, preceding knowledge—a power which impels us to act and to 
produce.”56 Just as Bergson declared moral conscience to be the pressure of 
obligation “as weighing on the will like a habit, each obligation dragging 
behind it the accumulated mass of [all] the others,”57 for Guyau duty is a fact 
“imposing itself on consciousness as a superior force.”58 From this shared set 
of insights, it follows that their strategy to study obligation will look very 
much alike.59 And indeed, Guyau asserts we must “try to clearly show this 
fact [of obligation] in its essential variations, and in its relations with other 
similar facts of consciousness.”60 Thus, correspondingly to Bergson’s search 
for phenomena with analogous effects to those of obligation, Guyau sets out 
to look for “admissible ‘equivalents’ or ‘substitutes’ of duty.”61 
Among the suitable equivalents of duty, Guyau identifies “the love of 
risk in action and of struggle.”62 Both rationalists and hedonists, he claims, 
consider moral dilemmas as if the uncertainty of the outcomes could be 
somehow overcome.63 Instead, his treatment makes manifest that the love of 
risk should be much more than just a disposition that can “vary” without 
substantially affecting agency itself, as economists assume in the notions of 
high or low risk-aversion. In microeconomic theory, our disposition towards 
risk is just one more datum in the agent’s “given preferences.” In Guyau’s 
picture, instead, the love of risk is more than just a preference: it concerns the 
agent’s moral capacity itself.64   
Let us analyze more closely what this means. Guyau explores 
uncertainty as it is experienced by the agent. He acknowledges at the outset 
that the pleasure of victory and conquest tinge to a great extent the lure 
exerted by them.65 For that reason, he says, we find clear expressions of the 
love of risk in professions such as the soldier, the huntsman, the traveler, the 
colonist, the medical doctor, and even the engineer.  
That being said, he notices that victory, as the positive outcome of a risky 
undertaking, is merely one element among others that mark more deeply its 
moral meaning. At stake is not only victory, but also one’s deeds. Risk—as 
either danger or opportunity—implies a challenge, a call to action, which 
requires a disposition for adventure: “In calculating we must not take into 
account only good and bad chances, but also the pleasure of running these 
chances.”66 In other words, risk lets us become aware of our character as 
agents. Moreover, this awareness varies depending on the character of the 
opponent. We can be confronted, he explains, to other human beings in war, 
or to animals in hunting. We then identify ourselves as soldiers or hunters, 
respectively. We can also be challenged by nature or by objects, as the sailor 
who wrestles with the sea, the hiker with the mountain, the employee with a 
concrete task (and, we shall add, the writer with the blank page). 
Furthermore, we can resist the assault of “faceless” or impersonal enemies, 
like the patient who fights a mortal illness,67 the investor who struggles with 
5 2  |  B e r g s o n  a n d  t h e  M o r a l i t y  o f  U n c e r t a i n t y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.770 
a volatile and capricious financial world, or any “fighter in life” facing 
“difficulties of all sorts to be conquered.”68 Notice that in all the cases 
described by Guyau, risk—unlike chance—provides a much more personal 
epistemological compass: it defines both events and defines our identity more 
thoroughly.   
It is undeniable that in Guyau there is something of an “ethics of danger 
and adventure,” potentially implying that “the more intrepid, the more 
excellent.” He is certainly closer to Nietzsche than Bergson ever was. Still, I 
do not think that a straightforward invitation to boldness constitutes Guyau’s 
main epistemological insight here. As I see it, the point is not that those who 
are more prone to adventure feel more alive than people who are risk-averse, 
being therefore capable of superior action.69 Rather, the point is that, no matter 
if we pursue or avoid it, risk lets us feel our life, and allows us to become 
aware of its value. Being tempted by risk means being challenged by it, 
regardless of your “revealed preferences” on that respect.70  
Guyau indicates, furthermore, that “[t]o the pleasure of risk is often 
added that of responsibility.”71 For Guyau, risk is all the more thrilling when 
it combines adventure and gravity. To put it in Kantian terms, risk is sublime 
when it involves something that commands respect. However, notice the 
difference between the sublimity of risk in Guyau, and the sublimity of the 
law in Kant. Guyau’s risk involves not only the presence of a lofty goal or 
principle, but also the momentousness of being, there and then, accountable 
for it. What matters is the weightiness of undertaking the risk necessary for 
the achievement of a certain goal or for the actualization of a certain principle. 
Put differently, Guyau’s “love of risk” is analogous to Kantian respect, but 
with agency added. The “divinely great tension of mind and feelings” that we 
experience when confronted by risk is sublime only as it combines loftiness 
with the sense that it depends on us.72  
Guyau’s examination of the “experience of risk” in the light of Bergson’s 
reflections on “the belief in chance” suggests several points. First, both 
constitute two different ways of dealing with the unexpected—the latter 
moderate, the former extreme; and, second, relatedly, they are both analogous 
to duty or obligation. Risk, however, as we have seen, indicates the way 
toward an always-latent distortion of the civilized mind as it relates to 
uncertainty. Risk has an extraordinary capacity to summon our agency in a 
way a simple “number indicating the odds” would not. It produces a 
distortion, I think, because—independently of whether we are risk-takers or 
risk-averse—risk presents an appeal that strikes us as urgent, capable of 
blinding us to all other concerns. 
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The ambiguities of risk 
Guyau claims that our struggles (either with war, nature, illness, or difficulties 
in general) all share the character of the passionate duel: “In truth, he says, 
the doctor who starts for Senegal has decided upon a kind of duel with the 
yellow fever.”73 And indeed, the metaphor of the duel illustrates very well 
why “the love of risk” is a useful antidote for the shortcomings of the 
impersonal “belief in chance.” Since the fight will define the identity and the 
future of the fighters, there is no way in which the duelist could not take it as 
something personal. Again, risk sharpens our agency and defines our 
identity, and those might be good things. However, the history of dueling 
presents interesting transformations that hint, in turn, at the moral 
ambiguities of the “love of risk.”  
 The passionate duel finds its ancestor in the judicial duel of the Middle 
Ages, which was a procedure used to settle accusations in cases where there 
was no other evidence available, such as witnesses or a confession of one of 
the parts. The parts involved would engage in a single combat, and the 
assumption was that God would reveal his will in the outcome. In that sense, 
the judicial duel was not supposed to be really a contest between two 
adversaries, but only the occasion for God to communicate the truth. The 
significance of the combat derived not from action but from knowledge; and 
victory did not really mean greatness, but goodness. 
 Whereas the judicial duel had at its center the discovery of truth, during 
its historical transformations in the late 19th- and early 20th-century it came 
to be seen not only as an instance of pernicious and uncivil violence, but 
mainly as something absurd: a mere display of narcissistic and megalomaniac 
tendencies. Conrad’s short story The duelists illustrates this folly: the 
contenders have repeatedly fought each other for a lifetime, but none of them 
really knows anymore why they both keep doing it, nor the original basis of 
their enmity. The only motive that pushes them into fighting each other over 
and over is pure vainglory combined with imprudence.74 
 Exploring further Guyau’s suggestion to model our attitudes toward 
the struggles of life after the paradigm provided by the passionate duel, it is 
interesting to note that the duel—whether in its medieval or its modern 
version—represents, as an institution, a way of dealing with uncertainty. The 
judicial duel was supposed to be a medium for truth in the face of uncertainty 
(who is responsible for this crime?); on the other, the passionate duel also 
seeks some kind of certitude in a given conflict between two adversaries (who 
is the best—the more courageous, the more honorable—among the 
opponents?). While in the judicial duel it was innocence what was in doubt, 
the passionate duel is meant to prove the courage and honor of the rivals in 
question. In the former case, the combat was a medium for the revelation of a 
higher truth, while in the latter, it is the direct test of a mundane one.  
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 Now, this transformation in the history of dueling suggests that the 
moral purchase which Guyau wants to draw from the latter might not be as 
unproblematic as he seems to take it is. The duelist attitude that he identifies 
as the paragon of moral agency might be closer to the vanity of the boastful 
man than to the important task of seeking truth and delivering justice. In the 
judicial duel, the legitimacy of the result came from (divine) knowledge, while 
in the passionate one, it comes from mere force, usually motivated by 
effrontery or, even worse, by domineering impulses.  
 If indeed the love of risk partakes in character with the passionate duel, 
then perhaps the only relation with uncertainty that this experience can offer 
to the modern mind dangerously oscillates between truth and absurdity, 
justice and force, meaning and meaninglessness. Thus, it is not clear the extent 
to which the love of risk can in fact be a good substitute for the moral 
shortcomings of the belief in chance: it might be able to make up for the 
frustratingly impersonal character of the latter, offering in principle an arena 
in which to exercise agency more assertively. But then, paradoxically, by 
exposing our agency in all its empowerment and all its vulnerability at the 
same time (i.e., displaying uncertainty in all its magnitude), the feeling of risk 
has very often left us with a well-known dilemma—a grim one, indeed, which 
can be seen most clearly, I think, in the field of politics.  
Whenever risk, contingency, and insecurity are given a preeminent 
focus in political thought—when they are turned into the main problems to 
be addressed—we are usually left with two options: either total insurance 
against risk at the cost of liberty (think of Hobbes’ Leviathan), or the absurdity 
of experiencing risk for the mere joy of it (the “intoxication with danger,” as 
Guyau calls it, illustrated by the extolment of—or at least the compliance 
with—violence in different versions of nationalism, colonialism, capitalism, 
and terrorism, and displayed by a number of adventurers in politics, war, and 
finance).75  I understand this dilemma as the instability of agency: it shows the 
difficulty of achieving a “middle ground” in our dealings with uncertainty, 
that neither stultifies agency by reducing it pure obedience, nor distends it 
through megalomania or recklessness. 
 
Conclusion 
As I said before, beginning with Plato, uncertainty has always informed moral 
and political theories in some way or another. More recently, Michael Sandel 
has articulated a communitarian attack against the legitimacy that speculation 
has acquired in contemporary economic systems.76 The claim is that 
speculation has corroded the values that we presumably uphold in the legal 
and political spheres, as distinctive of the way of life that the people living in 
constitutional democracies collectively endorse.  
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 In today’s global capitalism, he explains, “People increasingly make 
money, not by producing goods and providing services, but by managing 
risk.”77 Practices that have become regular—such as purchasing death 
insurance for employees, for very sick or old people, or even for complete 
strangers—show the extent to which the world of finance feeds on the 
“speculation on life and death.” This is troubling because “an ethic of 
speculation [is] corrosive of moral and civic norms worth caring about.”78 
 Others, from a more Foucauldian perspective, have explained how the 
power-dynamics in which subjectivities are produced in society (what is 
known as “governmentality”) fosters, in neoliberal contexts, a subjugating 
attitude of boldness and audacity in the face of risk, under the banner of a 
particular work ethic and a rhetoric of self-responsibility. Thus, for instance, 
“discourse[s] on fiscal self-realization extolling the virtues of 
entrepreneurship and voluntarism as a personal ethic” really instantiate a 
framework of oppression, in which people are enjoined to fulfill an ideal in 
which risks should be fearlessly tamed, and uncertainty courageously faced.79 
As a response, for example, one critic has suggested that procrastination can 
be endorsed as a resistance strategy, even if it represents “just one opening 
into the wider question of the contemporary practice of temporal 
counterconduct within the context of neoliberal governmentality.”80 
 Rather than viewing the love of risk as a corroding practice in which 
speculation bets on the life and death of other people, or as a the epitome of  
“the production of the neoliberal subject as a self-producing subject,”81 
following Bergson and Guyau, we see that, anthropologically speaking, our 
relation to uncertainty “naturally” displays a wide spectrum that allows for 
more or less assertive way of addressing it—or rather, to put it in a more 
Bergsonian fashion, a spectrum that allows for a more or less assertive way of 
letting us be addressed by it.82  
 As we have seen, there are advantages and disadvantages of the 
different positions in such a spectrum. Guyau’s analysis of the love of risk 
shows that a more voluntaristic way of relating to uncertainty might have the 
advantage of boosting agency, by giving us a more defined identity, 
enhancing our sense of responsibility or momentousness, and bringing 
forward the feeling of hope. However, Guyau’s analysis suggests that the love 
of risk presents a tendency towards polarization as well: just as in primitive 
religion superstition proliferated, gravitating towards the absurd and the 
monstrous, we tend to “dramatize” uncertainty, through the pressing 
injunction to take on challenges and risks, in the personal, professional, 
political spheres.83  
 The phenomenological bridge between the belief in chance and the 
feeling of risk that I have traced here, shows two things. First, that the 
tendency to replace the former with the latter—what I have called the 
dramatization of uncertainty—is rooted in our anthropological condition. In 
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other words, independently of the current capitalistic and neoliberal context, 
the love of risk is an ever-present human possibility—one which, moreover, 
has advantages and disadvantages of its own. Second, with Bergson, we 
explored the pedagogical purchase of the more moderate attitude toward 
uncertainty expressed in the belief in chance. In my interpretation, for 
Bergson—and in contrast to a criticism of speculation from a communitarian 
perspective that seeks to defend a set of shared ethical values, and to a more 
Foucauldian denunciation of risk-taking attitudes as a strategy of resistance 
within social power-structures—the virtues of such moderate attitude have to 
do, as we saw, with the proper cultivation of human agency.  
 We saw, for example, that by way of an appeal to luck, events acquire a 
status that “matches” our capacity to have some influence in them. This gives 
us the occasion of asserting our agency, but without assuming omnipotence 
or complete control, and therefore it represents a moderate way of relating to 
the uncertainty of the future. Given that luck is “a semi-voluntary choice that 
may serve as a counterpart to [one’s] own [choice],”84 it seems to provide, at 
least in principle, some check to an inflated notion of the will. Thus, the belief 
in chance becomes a model for our own agency, if we follow Bergson in his 
account of the latter. On this score, Bergson rejects a fixed personal identity in 
favor of one capable of relying on both habit and improvisation. This kind of 
personality has the advantage, regarding uncertainty, of giving us resources 
for accepting challenges and taking risks, without expecting to be in complete 
control of an envisaged plan, nor putting our whole identity at stake. With its 
help, we would be able to accept the dictates of fortune, and deal with them 
both through the solidity of routine and the grace of spontaneity. 
 While Bergson is famous for having articulated an account of agency in 
which freedom is made possible through a particular relation to our past, the 
relevance of uncertainty for action, as we have seen here, makes it clear that 
our relation to the future is significant for a Bergsonian understanding of 
freedom as well. From that perspective, we do not approach the self from the 
side of memory, but rather, focus on its character as a “moving body,” 
capable—as Bergson says—of answering to reality “with a yes or a no,” 
depending on what the circumstances require.85 In that sense, in contrast to 
the Kantian notion of the autonomous subject, as well as in contrast to a 
Guyauian/Nietzschean risk-lover Übermensch, Bergson offers a more modest, 
but also more versatile, notion of free agency in the face of uncertainty. 
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